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Morse v. Frederick:
Evaluating a Supreme Hit to Students’
First Amendment Rights
Kellie A. Cairns*
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,1 the
Supreme Court proclaimed that students do not “shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse
gate.”2  Ever since this celebrated declaration of student speech
rights, the Court has steadily continued to carve out exceptions
to this once expansive ruling.  Imprints on the broad grant of
rights set forth in Tinker include exceptions for “plainly offen-
sive” speech,3 school-sponsored speech,4 and now speech that
advocates illegal drug use.5
While further enabling the War on Drugs may indeed be a
commendable objective, the case of Morse v. Frederick6 did not
provide the appropriate vehicle to further curtail student
speech rights.  On the contrary, Frederick’s speech should be in-
terpreted as political rather than as promoting illegal drug use.
Frederick displayed his banner at a time when Alaska, the state
with the “most liberal drug laws in the country,”7 was consider-
ing the constitutionality of a voter referendum to overturn a
statute that decriminalized the personal possession of mari-
juana,8 a fact manifestly overlooked by the majority opinion.
* Pace University School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2009.  I would like to thank
my family and friends for their endless support in all of my endeavors.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. Id. at 506.
3. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
4. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
5. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
6. Id.
7. Anne Sutton, Alaska Gets Tougher on Marijuana?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
April 14, 2006, at A7.
8. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 n.8 (stating that at the time Frederick unfurled
his banner, the constitutionality of a voter referendum to recriminalize the posses-
sion of marijuana had yet to be decided). See infra, pp. 20-22.
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This article contends that the Supreme Court’s view of
Frederick’s banner, as speech which promotes illegal drug use,
was an incorrect and thus an improper basis for their decision
to establish an exception to Tinker’s expansive holding.  Part I
provides a historical overview of the trilogy of Supreme Court
cases that form the basis of student speech rights.  Part II dis-
cusses the facts, procedural history, holding and rationale of
Morse.  Part III argues that Frederick’s speech was in fact polit-
ical speech and should have been granted protection under the
First Amendment.  Part IV considers an alternative basis upon
which Frederick’s speech should have been protected.  Finally,
this article concludes by arguing that the Court unwisely carved
out an exception to Tinker for speech that advocates illegal drug
use on facts that plainly warranted First Amendment
protection.
I. A Historical Overview of Supreme Court Precedent
Three main standards developed by the Supreme Court
form the basis of student speech jurisprudence.  Beginning with
the “magna carta”9 of students’ free speech rights, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,10 the following trio of cases
shape the broad outline under which student expression is
evaluated.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
In 1965, students Mary Beth Tinker, John Tinker, and
Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to their public
school to demonstrate their view of the Vietnam War and sup-
port for a military truce.11  In response to their expression, the
school suspended each student and refused to reinstate them
unless they agreed to return without the armbands.12  The stu-
dents filed suit to enjoin the school district from disciplining
them for wearing the armbands.13  Both the district and appel-
late courts upheld the school’s action as constitutional, stating
9. Martha McCarthy, Student Expression Rights: Is a New Standard on the
Horizon?, 216 EDUC. L. REP. 15 (West 2007).
10. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11. Id. at 504.
12. Id.
13. Id.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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that disciplining the students was reasonable under the circum-
stances in order to prevent disturbance.14
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and re-
versed the lower courts,15 holding that the school district’s pro-
hibition of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War was
unconstitutional.16  To support this view, the Court stated that
“[i]n the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to free-
dom of expression of their views.”17  Most significantly, the
Court declared that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”18  Thus, in Tinker, the Court firmly planted the roots to
support students’ rights to free speech.
In enunciating Tinker’s parameters, the Court sought to
balance a student’s right to free speech against school officials’
authority to control conduct on school grounds.19  While school
officials may not regulate a student’s speech to “avoid the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopu-
lar viewpoint,”20 a school official does have a duty to protect
against disruptive conduct.21  The Court thus held that school
officials cannot regulate a student’s free speech rights unless
the speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others . . . .”22  Accord-
ingly, the Court found that the school district’s ban of the black
armbands was unconstitutional as there was no overt distur-
bance that occurred as a result of the expression.23
14. Id. at 504-05.
15. Id. at 505.
16. Id. at 513-14.
17. Id. at 511.
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id. at 513.
20. Id. at 509.
21. Id. at 513.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 508.  (“The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners
for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or dis-
turbance on the part of petitioners.  There is here no evidence whatever of peti-
tioner’s interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.  Accordingly, this case
does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students.”).
3
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The Court also addressed the issue of a school official’s re-
sponse to the apprehension of a potential disruption as a result
of a student exercising free speech rights, stating that “fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression.”24  Rather, schools must accept this
risk of disruption.25  Although a student may express a view-
point that sparks debate or disturbance, the court reasoned that
the shaping of the Nation’s future leaders rests on students’ ex-
posure to dissimilar ideas and the exchange of diverse opin-
ions.26  In setting forth such an expansive holding, the Court
advocated the utmost protection of a student’s free speech
rights, even within the school setting.27
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,28 decided seventeen
years after Tinker, the Court addressed the issue of offensive
speech.  Fraser, a high school student, delivered a campaign
speech to a voluntary assembly of approximately six hundred of
his peers as part of a school-sponsored educational program.29
Fraser’s speech, however, was filled with “elaborate, graphic
and explicit sexual metaphor[s]” that caused reactions by stu-
dents that ranged from hooting, yelling, and making gestures
graphically depicting the sexual activities referred to in the
24. Id.
25. Id.  See id. at 511 (cautioning against the potential for public schools to
become “enclaves of totalitarianism,” the Court urged that “students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com-
municate.  They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved.”); id. at 512 (stating that students should be entitled to express
their views on controversial subjects as part of the educational process).
26. Id. at 512.
27. Id. at 508-09.  (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.  Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.  Any variation from the
majority’s opinion may inspire fear.  Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom,
or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance.  But our Constitution says we must take this
risk, and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often dispu-
tatious, society.”) (citations omitted).
28. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
29. Id. at 677.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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speech to utter bewilderment and embarrassment.30  After giv-
ing his speech, Fraser was suspended for three days and in-
formed that he would not be considered as a potential
commencement ceremony speaker.31
In response, Fraser brought an action against the school
district for the violation of his First Amendment rights pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32  The district and appellate courts held
that Fraser’s First Amendment rights were indeed violated.33
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and reversed.34
The Court began its opinion by enunciating the now univer-
sally accepted principle that students’ rights in public schools
“are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings.”35  Under this theory, the Court distinguished
Fraser’s lewd and vulgar speech from the political message
evoked by Tinker’s black armbands.36  The sexual innuendos
which pervaded Fraser’s speech “were unrelated to any political
viewpoint”37 and “plainly offensive,”38 thereby outside the
bounds of Tinker’s expansive approach to students’ free speech
rights.39  The Court contended that “[t]he First Amendment
does not prevent the school officials from determining that to
permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as [Fraser’s] would un-
dermine the school’s basic educational mission.”40  Since Fra-
ser’s speech was “wholly inconsistent” with the school’s
30. Id. at 678.
31. Id. Fraser’s suspension was premised on his violation of the Bethel High
School disciplinary rules regarding obscene language.  Specifically, the rule pro-
vides that “ ‘[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the edu-
cational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or
gestures.’” Id.
32. Id. at 679.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) provides:
Every person who, under color of any . . . custom . . . of any State . . . sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .
Id.
33. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
34. Id. at 680.
35. Id. at 682.
36. Id. at 681.
37. Id. at 685.
38. Id. at 683.
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id.
5
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“fundamental values,” the Court held that his speech was un-
protected and therefore subject to disciplinary action by the
school.41
In Fraser, the Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s
precedent for “plainly offensive” speech that is both vulgar and
lewd.42  However, in doing so, the Court failed to develop a clear
analytical framework to evaluate subsequent student speech
cases.43  Federal courts have since struggled in applying Fraser,
because the precise contours of what constitutes “plainly offen-
sive” speech are not clearly defined.44  As will be discussed in-
fra, the Court’s decision to permit school officials to discipline
student speech that undermines a school’s basic educational
mission has been broadly construed, thereby narrowing the
Court’s initial approach as set forth in Tinker.45
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years after Fraser was decided, the Supreme Court
made its third effort at determining the appropriate balance be-
tween students’ free speech rights and school officials’ authority
to regulate conduct in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.46
41. Id. at 685-86.  This also adheres to the Court’s holding in Tinker because
Fraser’s speech disrupted the school assembly at which he spoke. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
42. See Douglas D. Frederick, Restricting Student Speech That Invades
Others’ Rights: A Novel Interpretation of Student Speech Jurisprudence in Harper
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 479, 483 (2007) (explaining that
“the Court merely created another category of speech with its own framework,”
rather than weakened the standard in Tinker).
43. See Jerry C. Chiang, Plainly Offensive Babel: An Analytical Framework
for Regulating Plainly Offensive Speech in Public Schools, 82 WASH. L. REV. 403,
409 (2007).
44. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Sailing the Uncharted Waters of Free Speech
Rights in Public Schools: The Rocky Shoals and Uncertain Currents of Student T-
Shirt Expression, 219 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 10 (West 2007). See also Frederick v.
Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2008).  The Ninth Circuit in Morse reversed the district court’s decision,
which was based upon Fraser, and stated that “[t]he phrase ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’
may be funny, stupid, or insulting, depending on one’s point of view, but it is not
‘plainly offensive’ in the way sexual innuendo is.”  Id.
45. See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the school’s right to prohibit Marilyn Manson T-shirts because the rock
group promotes disruptive and demoralizing values that are inconsistent with and
counter-productive to the educational mission of the school).
46. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR105.txt unknown Seq: 7 20-FEB-09 14:21
2008] MORSE V. FREDERICK 157
In Kuhlmeier, a high school principal exercised editorial control
over a school-sponsored newspaper that was published as part
of a journalism class.47  Specifically, the principal deleted two
pages of the publication that included an article about student
pregnancy and another concerning the effect of divorce on
students.48
The Court held that the school was permitted to “[exercise]
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”49
Here, the Court rationalized that the newspaper, published as
part of a high school journalism class, could be fairly character-
ized as part of the school’s curriculum.50  Since the relevant ex-
pression concerned school-sponsored speech, rather than pure
student speech, Tinker did not directly govern this issue.51  In-
stead, where a school is required to “lend its name and re-
sources to the dissemination of student expression,” a great deal
of flexibility is granted—so long as any such editorial control is
limited to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”52
II. Morse v. Frederick: Background
A. Factual Background
On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed
through Juneau, Alaska as part of the opening events for the
Salt Lake City, Utah Winter Games.53  As part of their route,
torchbearers passed in front of the Juneau-Douglas High School
(“JDHS”) during school hours.54  Students were permitted to
47. Id. at 264.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 273.
50. Id. at 271.
51. Id. at 272 (“A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use
. . . or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social
order’ or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters
of political controversy.”) (citations omitted).  The Kuhlmeier holding was thus lim-
ited to speech that may reasonably be viewed as being “school-sponsored,” rather
than inclusive of any and all student speech that takes place on school grounds.
See id.
52. Id. at 272-73.
53. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
54. Id.
7
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leave their classes and watch the relay from the sidewalk
outside the school, while teachers and administrative officials
monitored the students, as part of an “approved social event or
class trip.”55
Frederick, a JDHS student, arrived late to school but joined
his classmates to watch the event at a spot conspicuously se-
lected as easily visible to the television crews filming that par-
ticular leg of the relay.56  Frederick and his classmates’ plan to
appear on television, however, did not end there.  As the relay
runners and television cameras passed by their location, Fred-
erick and his friends unfurled a fourteen-foot banner that
stated, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”57  Upon viewing the banner,
Deborah Morse, the JDHS principal, demanded that the banner
be taken down.58  Frederick was the only student who refused.59
Morse subsequently seized the banner and suspended Fred-
erick for ten days for violating Juneau School Board Policy No.
5520,60 which pertains to advocacy of illegal drug use.61  Freder-
ick then administratively appealed his suspension to the Ju-
neau School District Superintendent, who denied his claim.62
In his report, the superintendent relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fraser as the basis for upholding Frederick’s suspen-
sion, viewing the banner as “speech or action that intrudes upon
the work of the schools.”63  The superintendent further stated
that the speech was not political in nature, but rather poten-
tially disruptive to the event and “clearly disruptive” of the
school’s educational mission.64  In response, Frederick filed a
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Murad Hussain, The “Bong” Show: Viewing Frederick’s Pub-
licity Stunt through Kuhlmeier’s Lens, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 292 (2007)
(characterizing Frederick’s conduct as intentionally “hatch[ing] a plan to get on
television”).
57. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622; Hussain, supra note 56, at 292.
58. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2622-23.  Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 provides that “ ‘[t]he
Board specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates
the use of substances that are illegal to minors . . . .’ ” Id. at 2623.
61. Id. at 2623.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (“ ‘The common-sense understanding of the phrase ‘bong hits’ is that it
is a reference to a means of smoking marijuana.  Given [Frederick’s] inability or
unwillingness to express any other credible meaning for the phrase, I can only
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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§ 1983 claim, alleging that his First Amendment right to free
speech was violated by both Morse and the school board.65
B. District Court Decision
The district court granted summary judgment for the
school board and Morse, holding that Frederick’s First Amend-
ment rights were not violated and that the “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” phrase constituted unprotected speech.66  In support of
its view, the district court relied on Fraser to extend the reach
of a school’s authority to speech that “might undermine the
school’s basic educational mission . . . .”67  Since the Juneau
School Board determined that the banner’s message under-
mined its educational mission by promoting illegal drug use, the
district court reasoned that Morse had the authority, “if not the
obligation,” to demand that the sign be taken down.68  Accord-
ingly, the district court ruled in favor of Morse and the school
board.69  Frederick then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
C. Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by focusing on evidence
of several disruptive events that occurred during the Olympic
Torch Relay, where Frederick’s banner was unfurled—such as
students throwing plastic soda bottles and snowballs at each
other and others becoming involved in fights.70  Any evidence of
a substantial disruptive event stemming from Frederick’s dis-
play of the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner was, however, no-
agree with the principal and countless others who saw the banner as advocating
the use of illegal drugs.  [Frederick’s] speech was not political.  He was not advo-
cating the legalization of marijuana or promoting a religious belief.  He was dis-
playing a fairly silly message promoting illegal drug use in the midst of a school
activity, for the benefit of television cameras covering the Torch Relay.  [Freder-
ick’s] speech was potentially disruptive to the event and clearly disruptive of and
inconsistent with the school’s educational mission to educate students about the
dangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their use.’”).
65. Id. at 2620, 2623 (“[Frederick] sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
unspecified compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.”).
66. Frederick v. Morse, No. 02-008, 2003 WL 25274689, at *4-6 (D. Alaska
May 27, 2003).
67. Id. at *5.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *6
70. Fredrick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2006).
9
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ticeably absent from this list.71  While the Ninth Circuit
admitted that some “pro-drug graffiti” was found on the school
grounds in the days following the relay, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the principal’s motive in taking the sign down was
not to prevent such effects, but instead to prevent the display of
offensive material that violated school policy.72
In reversing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
“proceed[ed] on the basis that the banner expressed a positive
sentiment about marijuana use” that was nonetheless “vague”
and “nonsensical.”73  The Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that
Morse and the school board conceded that their main concern in
taking the banner down and upholding Frederick’s punishment
was not the risk of disruption, but rather the potential that the
banner would be construed as advocating illegal drug use.74  In
considering the issue of “whether a school may, in the absence
of concern about disruption of education activities, punish and
censor non-disruptive, off-campus speech by students during
school-authorized activities because the speech promotes a so-
cial message contrary to the one favored by the school,” the
Ninth Circuit determined that the simple answer to such an in-
quiry is “ ‘[n]o.’”75
The Ninth Circuit first considered the Tinker precedent
and its application to Frederick’s banner.  Recognizing that
Tinker grants public school students the constitutional right to
engage in speech that may at times oppose government policy,
the Ninth Circuit held that students, like Frederick, should not
be disciplined for taking such contrary positions.76  Just as the
students in Tinker were constitutionally permitted to display
armbands that demonstrated their opposition to the Vietnam
War, a position plainly divergent from the Government’s stance,
Frederick’s banner also justified similar protection.77
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1116.
73. Id. at 1118.
74. Id. at 1117.
75. Id. at 1118.
76. Id.
77. Id. (“Tinker disposes of the School Board’s argument that ‘school adminis-
trators were entitled to discipline Frederick’s attempt to belittle and undercut this
critical mission’ of preventing use of illegal drugs by a sign that was ‘a parody of
the seriousness with which the school takes its mission to prevent use of illegal
drugs.’”). Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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The Ninth Circuit also considered the Fraser decision.
While Fraser concerned a sexually suggestive campaign speech
brimming with innuendo that was deemed “vulgar,” “lewd,” and
“plainly offensive,”78 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner as potentially “funny, stupid, or
insulting . . . but . . . not ‘plainly offensive’ in the way sexual
innuendo is.”79  The Ninth Circuit also considered the political
aspects of Frederick’s speech, stating that “it is not so easy to
distinguish speech about marijuana from political speech in the
context of a state where referenda regarding marijuana legali-
zation repeatedly occur and a controversial state court decision
on the topic had recently issued.”80  Unlike the district court,
which neglected to refer to the political context of Frederick’s
banner, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “messages about
marijuana have a degree of political salience to them and might
be understood as political advocacy [in Alaska]”81 and thus cate-
gorized the banner as analogous to the political expression of
the students in Tinker rather than the “plainly offensive” elec-
tion speech in Fraser.82  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found
that Fraser did not constitute the controlling authority under
the circumstances.83
The Ninth Circuit also viewed the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kuhlmeier as inapplicable to Frederick’s banner.84  In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit considered Frederick’s banner as
neither sponsored nor endorsed by the school and in no way af-
filiated or representative of its curriculum.85  Since Frederick’s
banner did not implicate any type of school-sponsored speech,
Kuhlmeier could not apply.86
The Ninth Circuit then considered Fraser’s reach with re-
spect to protecting a school’s authority to punish student speech
that is viewed as “ ‘undermin[ing] the school’s basic educational
78. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
79. Morse, 439 F.3d. at 1119.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1118 n.4 (citing Noy v. State, 83 P.2d 545, 545-46 (Alaska Ct. App.
2003)).
82. Id. at 1119.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1119-20.
86. Id. at 1119.
11
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mission.’”87  The Ninth Circuit urged “some limit on the school’s
authority to define its mission in order to keep Fraser consistent
with the bedrock principle of Tinker.”88  Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted Fraser as permitting school officials to sup-
press only that speech which “disrupts the good order necessary
to conduct their educational function.”89
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Sixth
Circuit, which interprets Fraser as providing school officials
with “wide-ranging discretion to determine the appropriateness
or inappropriateness of certain messages at school.”90  Instead,
the Ninth Circuit adhered to the approach followed by the
Fourth Circuit, which maintains “that student speech that is
neither plainly offensive nor school-sponsored can be prohibited
only where the school district demonstrated a risk of substan-
tial disruption.”91  Thus, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Frederick’s
banner through Tinker’s lens and held that “to censor or punish
student speech, the school must show a reasonable concern
about the likelihood of substantial disruption to its educational
mission.”92  Since Morse and the school board insisted Frederick
take his banner down solely because they believed it to conflict
with the school’s anti-drug mission, rather than out of reasona-
ble concern for potential disruption among the student body,
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” while indeed controversial, constituted
protected speech.93
87. Id. at 1120 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1122 (“[C]lothing may be banned when it contains ‘symbols and
words that promote values that are [ ] patently contrary to the school’s educational
mission.’” (quoting Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th
Cir. 2000))).
91. Id. (citing Newsom v. Albermarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 260 (4th
Cir. 2003) (holding that a student’s decision to wear a T-shirt depicting men shoot-
ing weapons did not conflict with the school’s message against guns, but rather
was protected under the First Amendment as no substantial disruption occurred
as a result of the student wearing the clothing)).
92. Id. at 1123.
93. Id. The Court further found that Morse was not entitled to qualified im-
munity as Frederick’s right to exercise his free speech right was “clearly estab-
lished.” Id. at 1125.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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D. Supreme Court Decision
Morse and the school board filed an appeal with the Su-
preme Court, which granted certiorari.94  In a 5-4 decision, with
Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, the Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit, finding that Frederick’s banner did
not constitute protected speech.95  The Court reasoned that
Morse and the school board did not violate Frederick’s rights by
seizing the banner and suspending him for displaying it at the
relay.96
The Court made clear that Morse involved a school speech
case.  Although the Court admitted that Frederick’s banner was
not displayed on school grounds, the Court found that the con-
text of the speech was similar to that of an approved school trip
and thereby subject to Morse’s authority.97  In doing so, the
Court narrowed the relevant inquiry to solely that of a school
speech case, thereby avoiding any question of whether Freder-
ick’s speech was, in fact, off-campus speech.98
The Court also supported Morse’s view that the “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS” banner would be interpreted by those viewing it
as promoting illegal drug use.99  Characterizing the phrase
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as either an imperative or celebratory
expression, the Court found that it undeniably referred to ille-
gal drugs.100  Accordingly, the Court stated that the case did not
involve any “political debate over the criminalization of drug
use or possession.”101
94. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
95. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2624.
98. Id. Many questions regarding the parameters of a school’s authority to
exercise control regarding student speech that takes place off-campus, which re-
sults in effects that occur on-campus, persist.  Here, Frederick technically unfurled
his banner off-campus, beyond the schoolhouse gates.  Nonetheless, any discussion
of this murky area of law was avoided by analogizing the event to that of a “school
trip.” See Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of
School Discipline of Student Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 727 (2007) (discussing the implications of off-campus speech in the con-
text of the internet).
99. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
100. Id. at 2625.
101. Id. Here, the Court refuted Justice Stevens’s dissent, which suggested
that the speech is political in nature. See id. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Court held that the phrase could be viewed as an imperative to
13
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In narrowing the relevant issue to whether, pursuant to the
First Amendment, a school official may restrict school speech
that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use, the
Court fashioned a new exception to Tinker’s expansive hold-
ing.102  While conceding that Frederick’s banner did not consti-
tute lewd or vulgar speech, like that found in Fraser,103 the
Court invoked Fraser to emphasize that “ ‘the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coex-
tensive with the rights of adults in other settings.’”104  The
Court, however, was careful to state that Frederick’s speech
was not “plainly offensive,” as opposed to the speech at issue in
Fraser.105  Instead, the Court focused solely on the fact that
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” could be reasonably viewed as advocat-
ing illegal drug use.106
Although the Court admitted the banner was “cryptic” and
“probably means nothing at all” to some people, it nevertheless
found that it advocated illegal drug use, therefore falling be-
yond First Amendment protection.107  In a lengthy analysis of
the dangers of drug use by schoolchildren and the important
role schools play in educating students about such harm,108 the
Court found that the school’s concern in preventing drug abuse
fell outside of Tinker’s admonition against the prohibition of
student speech due to “ ‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
“take bong hits” or “smoke marijuana” or “use an illegal drug.” Id. at 2625 (major-
ity opinion).  Additionally, the Court noted that the banner could be interpreted as
celebrating drug use (e.g. “we take bong hits”). Id.  The Court found no distinction
between these two alternative positions. Id.
102. Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
682 (1986)).
105. Id. The Court stated that adopting such an expansive rule would stretch
Fraser too far and might be later construed as implicating political and religious
speech that may indeed be offensive in certain circumstances.
106. Id. at 2625.
107. Id. at 2624.
108. Id. at 2628-29.  The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the stagger-
ing number of young people who admit to using illegal drugs, and referred to the
influence of peer pressure as “the single most important factor leading schoolchil-
dren to take drugs.” Id. at 2628.  Accordingly, the Court found that Frederick’s
banner, which “celebrat[ed] illegal drug use” directly challenged the school’s mis-
sion to educate children on the dangers of such conduct.  Id.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/5
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point.’”109  In fashioning a new exception to Tinker, the Court
established that student speech reasonably understood as pro-
moting illegal drug use, yet not political in nature, does not con-
stitute protected speech.110  Accordingly, the Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision and found in favor of Morse and the
school board.111
E. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas’s concurrence urged that Tinker be over-
ruled on the grounds that the “Constitution does not afford stu-
dents a right to free speech in public schools”112 and advocated
that regulation of student speech should be governed by school
boards and legislatures.  In contrast, Justice Alito’s concurrence
shapes the contours of Morse’s ruling and outlines its precise
limits.  Accordingly, Justice Alito stated that his agreement
with the majority opinion goes no further than limiting:
(a) . . . speech that a reasonable observer would inter-
pret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) [as provid-
ing] no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any politi-
cal or social issue, including speech on issues such as
the “wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing mari-
juana for medicinal use.”113
Justice Alito joined the majority “on the understanding
that the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of
the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restric-
tions.”114  He also disagreed with the school board’s argument
that the First Amendment allows school officials to exercise
control over speech that interferes with the school’s educational
mission.115  Instead, he stated that such a ruling would provide
109. Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
110. Id. at 2629.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer concurred in the
judgment that Fredrick’s claim must be dismissed, but upon qualified immunity
grounds and not for the constitutionality of the speech. See id. at 2638-43 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2637.
115. Id.
15
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public school officials with “a license to suppress speech on po-
litical and social issues based on disagreement with the view-
point expressed.”116  Justice Alito’s opinion, therefore, rested on
the grounds that speech that promotes illegal drug use poses a
serious threat to student safety, thus warranting its exclu-
sion—so long as it is not political.117
F. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Souter and
Ginsberg, disagreed with the majority’s decision to uphold “a
punishment meted out on the basis of a listener’s disagreement
with her understanding (or, more likely, misunderstanding) of
the speaker’s viewpoint.”118  Accordingly, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the decision “invites stark viewpoint discrimina-
tion.”119  The government, he asserted, cannot prohibit the
expression of an idea that society finds to be offensive or disa-
greeable.120  In support of this view, he cited the Court’s earlier
decision in Brandenberg v. Ohio121 for the proposition that a
person cannot be punished for advocating illegal conduct unless
the advocacy is “likely to provoke the harm that the government
seeks to avoid.”122
Justice Stevens further stated that creating a new excep-
tion for speech that promotes drug use is without support in
case law and contrary to First Amendment values.123  Rather,
he viewed the message as failing to advocate anything at all.
Referring to the sign as a “nonsense message, not advocacy,”124
Justice Stevens acknowledged that Frederick’s stated purpose
in displaying the banner was to attract the attention of televi-
sion cameras rather than make a political statement and, there-
fore, argued that such a sign could “hardly be said to advocate
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2638.
118. Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
122. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandenberg,
395 U.S. at 449).
123. Id. at 2646.
124. Id. at 2649.
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anything.”125  He also did not view the banner as reasonably in-
citing others to use drugs, stating:
Admittedly, some high school students (including
those who use drugs) are dumb.  Most students, how-
ever, do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate,
and most students know dumb advocacy when they
see it.  The notion that the message on this banner
would actually persuade either the average student or
even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is
most implausible.126
In deriding the majority’s view that Frederick’s sign
amounted to advocacy of illegal drugs, Justice Stevens referred
to the importance of deliberation and debate among high school
students.127  He also pointed out the majority’s failure to con-
sider the political climate in Alaska regarding the issue of the
legalization of marijuana and Tinker’s emphasis on the impor-
tance of such free debate among students regarding both major-
ity and minority views, emphasizing that it is the minority who
is most deserving of First Amendment protection.128
III. Discussion
While the Morse Court fashioned an exception from its
holding’s restriction on “pro-drug” speech, based on the freedom
to engage in political discourse, it failed to properly apply it to
the very facts of Morse.129  Instead, the Court rested on the erro-
neous notion that Frederick’s sign did not constitute political
speech, stating that “not even Frederick argues that the banner
conveys any sort of political or religious message” and, there-
fore, that “this is plainly not a case about political debate over
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2649-50.
128. Id. at 2651 (“[A] rule that permits only one point of view to be expressed
is less likely to produce correct answers than the open discussion of countervailing
views.”).
129. See Hans Bader, Campaign Finance and Free Speech:  Bong Hits 4 Jesus:
The First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 161 (2006)
(“While the justices wrongly created a new ‘drug exception’ to the First Amend-
ment, they rightly declined to include political speech advocating drug legalization
within that exception.”).
17
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the criminalization of drug use or possession.”130  This conclu-
sion was reached, however, without regard to the context in
which Frederick’s speech was put forth.
While the Ninth Circuit and Justice Stevens acknowledged
and discussed Alaska’s political climate at the time Frederick
displayed his banner, the Court handily disregarded this criti-
cal issue.  Rather, the Court relied on Frederick’s admission
that he did not intend to make a political statement, but sought
only to attract the attention of the television cameras131 to con-
clude that Frederick’s speech was not political in nature.  This
conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the Court’s ruling in
Spence v. State of Washington.132
A. Frederick’s Intent (or Lack Thereof) to Make a Political
Statement
In Spence, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s
conviction for improperly using the American flag for exhibition
or display, because it found that his conduct constituted pro-
tected speech.133  Specifically, the defendant flew an American
flag, with a large peace symbol comprised of removable tape af-
fixed to both sides, outside of his apartment window.134  In find-
ing that the defendant’s expression was protected, the Court
referenced the armbands in Tinker to note that “the context in
which a symbol is used for the purposes of expression is impor-
tant, for the context may give meaning to the symbol.”135
Just as the context of the defendant’s flag in Spence—“the
Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy”136—was
viewed as giving meaning to his expression, the context of Fred-
erick’s speech—a state-wide, public debate regarding Alaska’s
130. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
131. ACLU Slams Supreme Court Decision in Student Free Speech Case,
ACLU, June 25, 2007,  http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2006term/morsev.frederick/30
230prs20070625.html (reporting that Frederick said the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” mes-
sage “ ‘was never meant to have any substantive meaning. It was certainly not
intended as a drug or religious message. I conveyed this to the principal by ex-
plaining it was intended to be funny, subjectively interpreted by the reader and
most importantly an exercise of my inalienable right to free speech.’”).
132. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
133. Id. at 413-15.
134. Id. at 405-06.
135. Id. at 410.
136. Id.
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legal position on the legalization of marijuana, referred to by
Justice Stevens as “an issue of considerable public concern in
Alaska”137—should also provide such significance.  While the
Spence decision placed particular emphasis on the defendant’s
intent to make such a political statement, the Tenth Circuit
subsequently diverged from this interpretation.  In Eagon
Through Eagon v. City of Elk City, Oklahoma,138 the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that the Court relied on the defendant’s intent in
Spence solely “because Spence’s message was not conveyed
‘through printed or spoken words’ . . . .”139  The Tenth Circuit
therefore found that “implicit in this statement is the principle
that perception and intent analysis is not necessary where
printed or spoken words are used . . . .”140  Under this analysis,
Frederick’s intent in displaying the banner should not be deter-
minative in whether his speech was indeed political.  Emphasis
should instead be placed solely on the banner’s content and
context.
B. The Political Context of Frederick’s Speech
At the time Frederick’s “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner was
displayed at the Olympic Torch Relay, Alaska was in the midst
of a state-wide political debate about the legalization of mari-
juana.141  The ruling established in Ravin v. State of Alaska,142
the seminal case involving the decriminalization of marijuana
in Alaska, was then being contested through a voter referen-
dum.143  In Ravin, the Supreme Court of Alaska found, based
upon the Alaska Constitution’s explicit right to privacy,144 that
adults may constitutionally possess marijuana in their home for
137. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 n.8 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
138. 72 F.3d 1480 (10th Cir. 1996).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1485.
141. Id.
142. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
143. Id. at 497.
144. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is rec-
ognized and shall not be infringed.”).
19
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personal use.145  The decision, however, did not provide specific
guidelines for the appropriate exercise of this right.146
In response to Ravin, the Alaska state legislature amended
its law and “exempted marijuana from the normal penalties for
possession of ‘depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drugs’
. . . .”147  In 1982, the Alaska state legislature moved the drug
laws from Title 17 to Title 11.148  In that same year, the state
legislature enacted additional provisions, which made the pos-
session of four ounces or more of marijuana a class B misde-
meanor.149  These provisions exempted personal non-public use
of less than four ounces of marijuana from criminal (and civil)
penalties pursuant to Title 11 and thus effectively legalized
such use.150  In 1990, however, the voters amended this statute
by passing a ballot initiative,151  which directly contravened
Ravin’s holding152 by providing that “possession of any amount
of marijuana less than eight ounces was a class B misde-
meanor.”153  The constitutionality of this newly amended stat-
ute had yet to be challenged in the Supreme Court of Alaska at
the time Frederick displayed his banner.154  Subsequently, in
145. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 (overruling ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.010 (1975),
which provided that “it is unlawful for a person to manufacture, compound, coun-
terfeit, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, give,
barter, supply, or distribute in any manner, a depressant, hallucinogenic or stimu-
lant drug.”).
146. Id. at 511-12.
147. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 541 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).  Specifically, for-
mer ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.110(e) (repealed 1982) “prohibited possession by an
adult of one ounce or less of marijuana in a public place. It also prohibited posses-
sion by an adult of any amount of marijuana for personal use in a non-public
place.” Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 541-42. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a) (1982) further “prohibited use
of marijuana in a public place, or possession of one ounce or more of marijuana in a
public place, or possession of any amount of marijuana while operating a motor
vehicle, or possession of any amount of marijuana by a person under 19 years of
age.” Id. at 542 n.11.
150. Id. at 542.
151. Id. (citing Initiative Proposal No. 2, §§ 1-2 (effective Mar. 3, 1991), 11
ALASKA STAT., p. 872 (Lexis 2006)).
152. See id. (“We have concluded that [ALASKA STAT.] § 11.71.060(a)(1) is un-
constitutional to the extent that it proscribes marijuana possession that, under the
Ravin decision, is protected by article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution.”).
153. Id. (emphasis added) (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.060(a)(1), (b)).
154. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 n.8 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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2003, the statute was struck down by the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals in Noy v. State.155
This, however, was not the only issue of concern regarding
the legalization of marijuana.  In 1998, a voter initiative ap-
proved the decriminalization of the use of marijuana for medical
purposes.156  An effort to further broaden the rights granted by
the legislature subsequent to Ravin, however, failed in 2000.157
Given Alaska’s political climate, a great deal of public at-
tention, before, during, and after Frederick’s display of the
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner, focused on the issue of the le-
galization of marijuana.  The striking absence of any such refer-
ence to this ongoing political debate in Alaska is curious, and
the context in which Frederick’s banner was displayed was de-
serving of a more thorough analysis.  Had any attention been
devoted to this long-running political issue, it would have been
evident that Frederick’s banner, despite its failure to be held by
an individual specifically intending to make a political state-
ment, did, indeed, make such an assertion.  The appearance of
Frederick’s sign in the crowd likely called to mind the political
debate regarding the true extent of an individual’s right to use
marijuana, which, at that time, had persisted in Alaska for over
twenty-five years.  The Supreme Court failed to engage in such
an analysis, glibly stating that “this is plainly not a case about
political debate over the criminalization of drug use or
possession.”158
As a result of this analytical omission, the Court ultimately
misapplied its own Morse precedent—that public school officials
may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret
as advocating illegal drugs use, except that “speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or so-
cial issue . . . .”159  Under the facts of Morse, it is indeed plausi-
ble that Frederick’s banner may have been reasonably
155. 83 P.3d at 542.
156. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Alaska
1998 Ballot Measure No. 8 (approved Nov. 3, 1998), 11 ALASKA STAT., p. 882 (codi-
fied at ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010-17.37.080 (1999))).
157. See id. (citing Alaska 2000 Ballot Measure No. 5 (failed Nov. 7, 2000), 11
ALASKA STAT., p. 886 (granting amnesty to anyone convicted of any marijuana-
related crimes)).
158. Id. at 2625 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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interpreted as commenting on Alaska’s continuing debate on
the decriminalization of marijuana.  While the justices “rightly
declined to include political speech advocating drug legaliza-
tion” within the Morse precedent, they failed to properly apply
that standard to the specific circumstances surrounding Freder-
ick’s banner.160
C. “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” Fails to Constitute Speech that
Advocates Illegal Drugs Use
Frederick’s banner fails to fit within the parameters of the
Court’s holding in Morse on grounds that are separate from its
political nature.  An additional component of the Morse holding
specifically permits speech that “a reasonable observer would
interpret as advocating illegal drugs use” to be regulated by
public school officials.161  While “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” may be
viewed as “ ‘curious,’ ‘ambiguous,’ ‘nonsense,’ ‘ridiculous,’ ‘ob-
scure,’ ‘silly,’ ‘quixotic,’ and ‘stupid,’”162 it does not amount to
the type of advocacy that would, in fact, encourage and per-
suade other children to use and experiment with illegal drugs.
The majority opinion, however, views “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” as speech that is either imperative or celebratory.163  In
considering the celebratory nature of the speech, the Court
stated that “we discern no meaningful distinction between cele-
brating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow students and out-
right advocacy or promotion.”164  The Court favored a “pro-drug
interpretation” of the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner, thereby
finding that Morse was permitted to restrict its display.
Justice Stevens’s dissent, however, provides a better ap-
proach to determining whether the banner indeed advocates il-
legal conduct.  Referring to the landmark decision of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,165 Justice Stevens recited the fundamen-
tal principal that “punishing someone for advocating illegal con-
duct is constitutional only when the advocacy is likely to
160. Bader, supra note 129, at 162.
161. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito J., concurring) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2625 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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provoke the harm that the government seeks to avoid.”166
Under this premise, Frederick’s banner fails to satisfy this stan-
dard because the vast majority of students would not be per-
suaded to “take bong hits” or “celebrate bong hits” as a result of
viewing the sign.  Or, as Justice Stevens articulated, “[t]he no-
tion that the message on this banner would actually persuade
either the average student or even the dumbest one to change
his or her behavior is most implausible.”167  Thus, from an objec-
tive viewpoint, the banner wholly failed to constitute advocacy
under Brandenburg.
Although the majority supported a pro-drug interpretation
of the banner, they also considered “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” to
be a “cryptic” phrase that “probably means nothing at all” to
some people.168  This flies in the face of their pronouncement
that the banner could reasonably be found to constitute a pro-
drug message.169  If the speech is in fact “cryptic” as the major-
ity stated, it is further inconsistent with Federal Election
Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,170 which was an-
nounced on the same day as Morse.  In Wisconsin Right to Life,
Justice Roberts found that where the “First Amendment is im-
plicated, the tie goes to the speaker.”171  Justice Roberts contin-
ued by stating that “when it comes to defining what speech
qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy . . . we
give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.”172  Here,
experts have disagreed over the meaning of Frederick’s banner
in regard to whether it in fact constitutes advocacy,173 thereby
constituting a “close case” in which “the tie [should have gone]
to Frederick’s speech.”174
166. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 449).
167. Id. at 2649.
168. Id. at 2624 (majority opinion).
169. Id. at 2625.
170. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
171. Id. at 2669.
172. Id. at 2674.
173. See Bader, supra note 129, at 144, n.58 (referring to the differing opin-
ions of a language expert, who concluded that “the banner did not endorse drugs”
and a law professor who found that it could “plausibly be interpreted as pro-drug”).
174. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority at-
tempts to avoid criticism regarding the disparity between its views in Wisconsin
Right to Life and Morse by referencing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier’s maxim that
“First Amendment rights are ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the
23
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IV. Conclusion
When a majority of the Supreme Court found that Freder-
ick’s “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner was speech that could be
reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug use under a
new exception to Tinker’s broad precedent, it justified its hold-
ing by finding that, while the banner did not constitute political
speech, it did advocate illegal drug use.  In his dissent, Justice
Stevens challenged the underpinnings of the Court’s analysis,
urging instead that Frederick’s banner was political speech that
fell outside the parameters of advocacy.  While the Court’s sup-
port of the War on Drugs is noteworthy, the Morse holding
plainly ignores the political climate and context of Frederick’s
banner, thereby cutting off any potential for the display to fit
within the exception for political speech.  When viewed objec-
tively, Frederick’s speech fails to reach the level of advocacy re-
quired to constitute a reasonable belief that students would be
persuaded to alter their opinions and habits in light of viewing
the banner.
In Morse, the Court ultimately sought to create an excep-
tion to Tinker that would deter the use and abuse of illegal
drugs by students.  Unfortunately, the specific facts of the case
did not provide the appropriate vehicle to reach such a conclu-
sion, resulting in the improper punishment of Frederick and the
continued damage to the Court’s once expansive protection of
students’ rights as enunciated in Tinker.
school environment’” and further emphasizing that “there is no serious argument
that Frederick’s banner is political speech of the sort at issue in Wisconsin Right to
Life.” Id. at 2627 n.2 (majority opinion) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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